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Abstract 
The Great Recession 2007-09 has led to controversies around the role of fiscal policy. 
Academically this has translated into renewed interest in the effects of fiscal policy. Several 
studies have since suggested that fiscal multipliers are substantially larger in downswings or 
depressions than in the upswing. In terms of economic policy reactions countries have 
differed substantially in the fiscal stance. It is an important open question how big the impact 
of these policies on economic growth has been. The paper uses the regime-dependent 
multiplier estimates by Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) and by Gechert and Rannenberg 
(2014) to calculate the demand effects of fiscal policy for Germany, USA, UK, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain since 2008. This allows assessing to what extent fiscal 
policy explains different economic performances across countries. We find expansionary 
fiscal policy in 2008/09 in all countries, but since 2010 fiscal policies have differed. While 
the fiscal impact was roughly neutral in Germany, the UK, and the USA, it was large and 
negative in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
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Introduction 
"In a depressed, deflationary economy conventional fiscal prudence is dangerous 
folly," Paul Krugman (September 11, 2015 on New York Times) 
In 2008-09 advanced economies experienced the worst recession since the Great 
Depression. This experience has challenged economists and policy makers to reconsider the 
role of fiscal policy. Before the Great Recession, the majority view was one of a limited role 
of fiscal policy. In the early phase of the crisis 2008/09, there was a short-lived Keynesian 
revival. Economic policy was at that point leading (mainstream) economic theory. However, 
in summer 2010 there was a noticeable shift in fiscal policy. The case for austerity was put 
forward by several governments and by the European Commission. The programs 
administered by the Troika were imposing harsh austerity on countries in severe recession. 
While German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble was making the case for expansionary 
fiscal contractions (EFC) based on the findings of Alesina and others, a substantial body of 
academic literature had accumulated that suggests that fiscal multipliers are particularly large 
in recession, which is in direct contradiction to the notion of EFC. Several commentators 
have claimed that differences in fiscal policy go a long way in explaining the different 
economic performances of countries since then (Wren Lewis 2015, Krugman 2010, Gechert 
et al 2015). This paper will use recent estimates of regime-dependent multipliers to calculate 
the growth contributions of fiscal policy for the Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(which we will refer to as the GIIPS countries) and Germany, UK and USA. This will allow 
us to assess how much economic policy has differed across countries and to what extent it 
explains differences in economic performance. 
This paper uses the multiplier estimates by Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) and 
Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) to calculate the effect of fiscal policy on GDP in eight 
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OECD economies. Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) estimate simple multipliers in a panel 
of 21 OECD countries using a two-stage least square estimation (TSLS) approach whereas 
Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) offer a meta-analysis based on 98 published studies. The 
studies thus take two very different methodological approaches, but both identify regime-
dependent multipliers. We use these two studies to gauge plausible estimates for multipliers 
in the upswing and the downswing. The main part of the paper uses these multipliers to 
calculate the effects of the fiscal policy stance on GDP growth for different countries since 
2007. We are interested in the effects for the GIIPS which have experienced a particularly 
severe recession in comparison to that of the Germany, UK and USA which have seen a 
recovery of output since 2008.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the debate on fiscal policy. 
Section 3 discusses the literature on fiscal multipliers. Section 4 explains the calculation of 
the multipliers for eight countries since 2007 and the fiscal policy effects. Section 5 discusses 
the main findings and section 6 concludes. 
 
Swings in the fiscal policy debate 
Fiscal policy has seen big changes over the past decades. While some of these changes are 
closely related to developments in economic theory, others have been triggered by economic 
circumstances, in particular, crises, or by ideological shifts. In the post-war era, fiscal policy 
was assigned a prominent role, with full employment regarded as the primary economic aim. 
This was underpinned by the old Keynesian argument that in an economy with excess 
capacity, deficit-financed government spending is a powerful stabilization tool. The theory 
assumed that the fiscal multiplier is a function of marginal propensities of consumption, 
import, and taxation and the multiplier impact is considered to be larger than one.  
4 
 
Keynesian theory dominated the macroeconomic policy stance throughout the 1960s 
and 70s in most countries, even if its hegemony was somewhat uneven (Hall 1989). 
Meanwhile, the neoclassical counterattack came in the form of Monetarism which argued that 
the economy is anchored in the natural rate of unemployment (Friedman, 1968). Further, 
Monetarism claimed that the marginal propensity to consume out of current income is low as 
agents decide their spending based on permanent income (Friedman, 1957). Therefore, 
government deficit spending induces only little immediate additional private demand while it 
increases interest rates and crowds out private investment in the long-run. As a result, the size 
of the multiplier is lower than one in the short run. In the long-run, government spending 
leads to increases in debt and inflation with no impact on output.  
High inflation coupled with rising unemployment in the 1970s, weakened the 
Keynesian dominance in economic policy. As a result, in the 1980s, macroeconomic 
priorities shifted toward price stability and sound fiscal policy shaped by Monetarism. 
Academically, this was strengthened by New Classical economics, which criticized 
Keynesian theory and insisted on microfoundations for macroeconomic theory based on 
rational individuals and clearing markets (Laidler, 1986). When the government spends by 
issuing bonds, agents expect higher future taxes and reduce their consumption and increase 
savings (the Ricardian equivalence theorem reinstated by Barro 1989). Hence, the impact of 
government spending, in new classical Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models with Ricardian equivalence, is less than one.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were a series of other developments in 
economic theory. New Keynesian (NK) economists accepted neoclassical methodology but 
responded by arguing that despite rational expectations, there can be market failures and 
wage rigidities (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987). Hence, the implicit perfect capital markets 
assumption of Ricardian equivalence may not hold. When agents are finance-constrained, 
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their consumption will largely depend on current income (Mankiw, 2000). NK-DSGE models 
therefore include a share of Ricardian agents and finance-constrained consumers whose 
consumption depends on current income (Gali et al., 2007). Although the government 
spending multiplier in NK-DSGE models is positive and can be quite large, it is not long 
lasting because of neoclassical foundations and monetary policy following a Taylor-rule. 
New Keynesian models have neoclassical long-run properties.  
Before the crisis, there was thus a majority view, often called the New Consensus 
view, which regarded the market system as essentially self-stabilising. Any short-run demand 
management was assigned to monetary policy, managed by independent central banks that 
should follow inflation targeting or a Taylor rule. Fiscal policy, in this view, was restricted to 
automatic stabilisers and would aim for medium-term balanced budget (Arestis 2009, 
Blanchard et al 2010). The Great Recession of 2008 put into question the new orthodoxy. 
Faced with an unprecedented financial collapse and a sharp recession, policy makers used 
sizable fiscal intervention in 2008 and 2009. However, this was politically contested and by 
mid-2010 the pendulum swung back with harsh austerity imposed in particular on southern 
European countries. In this period, economic policy was characterised to some extent by 
improvisation and in academia, as in politics, there has been a polarisation of views. 
Within academia, the New Consensus view had been criticized by dissenting 
minorities, from different sides. From the Keynesian side, Post Keynesians have rejected the 
rational behaviour microfoundations for macroeconomic theory. Post Keynesian theory has 
been formulated as a coherent body of thought (Arestis 1992, Lavoie 2014, Palley 1996) that 
reinstates the Keynesian argument that involuntary unemployment is pervasive in market 
economies and that wage flexibility is not sufficient for full employment. Hysteresis 
phenomena are regarded as ubiquitous (Setterfield 1993, Stockhammer 2008, 2011) and 
financial markets are characterised by endogenous instability (Minsky 1986, Charles 2008). 
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As a consequence, Post Keynesians have maintained the view that fiscal policy is a key 
instrument for stabilisation and insisted that multipliers would be positive, large and long-
lasting, in particular in times of financial crises (Arestis and Sawyer 1998). The Post 
Keynesians thus had formulated positions that the New Keynesian have developed since the 
crisis, but with a different methodological starting point.  
The fiscal neutrality argument also came under attack from a different side. Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1990, 1997) and Alesina and Perotti (1995) coined the term Expansionary Fiscal 
Contraction (EFC) to suggest negative multipliers. They regress economic growth on the 
private consumption on Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) for a panel of OECD 
countries and conclude that episodes of fiscal consolidations are correlated with rapid 
economic growth.
1
 In a similar vein, Afonso (2006), in a panel study of EU15 countries over 
the period of 1970-2005, finds some evidence in favour of EFC for government final 
consumption spending, taxes, and social transfers. The inverse correlation of government 
spending and private consumption, he claims, amplifies when fiscal consolidation episodes 
occur. Proponents of EFC, in general, argue that with a large and sustained reduction in 
government spending, consumers will assume a future reduction in taxes and interest rates, 
which in turn will lead to higher income and private consumption. Economic policy in 
Europe has largely followed the EFC reasoning irrespective of a substantial amount of 
theoretical and empirical evidence for large multipliers during recessions.  
                                                 
1
 The empirical findings of the EFC literature have been questioned. In particular, Guajarado et al. (2011) 
argue that changes in CAPB, which had been used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1997), Alesina and Perotti 
(1996), and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) as the key fiscal consolidation variable, can be an outcome of non-
policy movements due to other developments such as a boom in stock market or devaluation. Hence, using 
changes in CAPB as measure of fiscal consolidations gives biased results Dullien (2012) moreover pointed to 
substantial data problems regarding the selection of alleged consolidation episodes that actually turned out as 
special accrual effects without a true fiscal impact 
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Since the crisis, New Keynesian-inspired research (in the USA and international 
organisations more so than in continental Europe) has made a powerful case for the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. Monetary policy soon hit the zero-lower-bound (ZLB). In this 
situation, interest rate policy becomes ineffective. This argument is reminiscent of the old 
Keynesian argument of the liquidity trap. The ZLB issue had always been a theoretical 
possibility in NK models, but until the crisis (other than for the case of Japan) it was regarded 
as a hypothetical scenario. Since the crisis, the New Keynesian reasoning has gone beyond 
policy ineffectiveness and, at least in its radical wing, questions the self-adjusting properties 
of the market system in times of debt overhang. Summers (2014) has suggested the 
possibility of secular stagnation, i.e. that the natural rate of interest may be (and will remain 
for some time) negative. In this situation conventional policies should pursue medium-term 
budget deficits. Arguably, this version of New Keynesian economics is close to the Post 
Keynesian view, even if that is rarely acknowledged. 
Inspired by these debates, there has been a re-assessment of the estimates of fiscal 
multipliers. In particular, the IMF has famously admitted that its macroeconomic models 
have substantially underestimated multipliers of fiscal policy in recessions (Blanchard and 
Leigh 2013). One of the developments is that recent empirical research allows for different 
effects of fiscal policy in the upswing and the downswing of the business cycle. This 
literature will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Estimating fiscal multipliers  
The estimation of the fiscal multiplier has a long tradition in macroeconomics. 
Recently three main estimation strategies have been widely used. One strand of the literature 
uses structural vector autoregression (VAR) techniques to identify the innovations in 
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government spending and taxation and estimate its impact on output. A second group uses a 
single equation estimation strategy and either uses exogenous variables such as military 
expenditures or econometric techniques like two stage least squares (TSLS) for identification. 
The third strand of the literature uses estimated or calibrated structural macroeconomic 
models. The vast majority of the available literature assumes linear multipliers and only 
recently there have been attempts to allow for multipliers to vary over the business cycle. A 
comprehensive review of these can be found in Gechert (2015), Hebous (2011) and 
Spilimbergo et al (2009). 
Within the VAR literature, the size of multiplier depends on sample, control variables 
and identification of shocks. A number of studies report a multiplier of larger than one for the 
US (see, for example, Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Gali et al. 2007; Fatas and Mihov 2001). 
Burriel et al. (2010) argue that the size of the multiplier in general increases when controlling 
for debt-to-GDP ratio, but it decreases for EU countries when controlling for financial stress. 
In addition, estimated multipliers are downward biased if financial variables are omitted 
(Gechert and Mentges, 2013).  
Compared to VAR studies, NK-DSGE model-based studies impose more theoretically 
motivated restrictions on the system. These restrictions include the existence of Ricardian 
consumers and the central bank following a Taylor rule. Forni et al. (2009) utilize a NK-
DSGE model for Euro Area for the period 1980-2005 and report that government 
consumption expenditures have a mild Keynesian effect on output. Ratto et al. (2009) study 
the impact of government spending shocks on output in the Euro Area for the period of 1981 
to 2006 and find that government consumption, investment and transfer shocks crowd-out 
private investment and private consumption of Ricardian consumers. In general, NK-DSGE 
models typically yield a small or negative impact of government spending on output due to 
the assumption of Ricardian households and monetary policy following a Taylor–rule. 
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The estimation of the regime-dependent multipliers, similar to linear estimation, can 
be categorized into three groups based on the estimation strategy. These are NK-DSGE, 
VAR, and single equation strategy. NK-DSGE models can have a nonlinear fiscal multiplier 
for several reasons. Fiscal multipliers in recessions can be large because of frictions due to 
asymmetric information between borrower and lender (Fernandez-Villaverde, 2010) and 
because of binding finance constraints (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). Further, the 
multipliers can also be large in recession because of the presence of those households whose 
borrowing is constrained by the value of their collateral (Turini et al., 2012) and a depressed 
labour market (Michaillat, 2012). Most prominently, Eggertsson (2009), Woodford (2011) 
and Christiano et al (2011) demonstrate that when monetary policy hits the ZLB, the 
multiplier can be substantially larger than otherwise.  
These theoretical arguments are supported by several empirical investigations. Using 
regime-switching VAR approaches, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Bachmann 
and Sims (2012) find a multiplier of larger than one during downswings. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012b) study OECD countries for the period of 1985-2010 and report a 
multiplier of 2.3 for the US in downswing compared to zero in upswings. De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013) report a multiplier of 1.4 during downswing vs. 0.6 during upswing for Spain 
during 1986-2012. In a similar vein, Thomakos (2012) finds a multiplier of 1.32 in 
downswing compared to zero during tranquil periods for Greece for the period 2000-2012. In 
opposition to the former studies, Ramey and Zubairy (2013) investigate nonlinearity for 
periods of high unemployment (i.e. average unemployment above 6.5 percent) and ZLB in 
the US and claim that multipliers are by and large linear.  
 Other studies have used TSLS estimations methods to measure the size of multiplier 
during the crisis and normal times. For example, Turini et al. (2012) study 56 countries and 
estimate multipliers for the period of banking crisis vs. normal times. They report a multiplier 
10 
 
of 0.8 during crisis and 0.2 in normal times. Afonso et al (2010) study 98 countries using 
TSLS estimation for the period of 1981-2007 and find a multiplier within a range of 0.6 to 
1.1. When they investigate nonlinearity between the periods of crisis vs. normal times, they 
find that multipliers are not statistically different among different regimes.  
In a more recent paper, Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) investigate nonlinear 
multipliers for the periods of downswing vs. upswing for 21 advanced countries over the 
period of 1979-2011. They primarily use government final consumption expenditure as an 
instrument. To overcome endogeneity of government spending, they employ TSLS 
estimation and use one year lagged value of government spending as an instrument for 
government spending. They find a government consumption multiplier of 3.07 in the 
downswing vs. 1.01 in an upswing.  
Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) conduct a meta-regression analysis of estimates of 
fiscal multipliers from econometric studies such as the ones listed above, based a dataset with 
1882 observations from 98 studies published between 1993 and 2013. They identify 
multipliers for several components of government spending and income: unspecified (overall) 
government spending, final consumption spending, investment, and military spending. They 
also report multipliers for government transfers and taxes. To analyse multipliers for different 
phases of the business cycle, they distinguish between regime-independent multiplier 
estimates as well as a lower (downswing) regime, and an upper (upswing) regime. According 
to the meta-estimates, spending multipliers increase by 0.6 to 0.8 units during downswings as 
compared to an average scenario. For government consumption in particular, the multiplier is 
approximately 1.8 in a downswing compared to 0.50 and 0.54 during the upswing and 
average scenario respectively.  
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Calculating growth contributions of fiscal policy 
In this paper, we seek to answer what has been the contribution of fiscal policy to 
GDP growth in seven European countries and the United States during and after the Great 
Recession. To accomplish this, we first identify the turning points for the business cycle for 
the period of 2007 to 2014, for each country. Then, we calculate the impact of the fiscal 
policy by multiplying the changes in fiscal policy with the respective multiplier in those 
periods. For multipliers, we use the results from Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) and 
Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) complementarily in order to cope with econometric model 
uncertainty. Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) use TSLS estimation technique and study 21 
advanced countries. They report a multiplier for government consumption; this is frequently 
used as a summary measure for fiscal policy, but to the extent that other fiscal components 
and tax income develop differently from government consumption, it may give misleading 
results. In contrast, Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) is based on meta-regression analysis of 
98 published papers. They report multipliers for different categories of government 
consumption (GCON), government investment (GINV), government transfers (GTRAN), and 
taxes (GTAX). They control for import share of GDP and thus have country-specific 
multipliers. A high level of import share means a greater leakage from the economy and thus 
a lower size of the multiplier. Table 1 presents the average multipliers for our countries. 
While regime-independent multipliers with the exception of GINV are below one and 
multipliers in upswing are all smaller than unity, downswing multipliers (with the exception 
of GTAX) are all above one. The largest one is GTRAN with a size of more than 2.78 for the 
US.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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For our calculations of the fiscal impact, we use both the estimates from Qazizada and 
Stockhammer (2015) and from Gechert and Rannenberg (2014). The Qazizada and 
Stockhammer (QS) multipliers are based on government consumption expenditures, but they 
are used as a proxy for total fiscal policy. The QS multipliers are assumed identical in all 
countries. The Gechert and Rannenberg (GR) multipliers differ according to import shares 
and are adjusted for each country for the corresponding year. For the GR total fiscal policy, 
we cumulate the effects for government consumption, government investment, taxes, and 
transfers.
2
  
For the calculations of multipliers based on Gechert and Rannenberg (2014), we need 
to make a set of adjustments. While the government expenditure data can be used directly, 
the government income variables need to take into account income induced by the 
governments’ own expenditures. The tax and transfer multipliers apply to the tax and transfer 
impulses, but some of the actual tax incomes are induced by the governments’ expenditures 
causing more tax income. The observed tax and transfer income thus needs to be adjusted. 
We define tax and transfers impulses as follows: 
∆𝑇𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒 = [∆𝑇𝑋 − 𝜀𝑇𝑋,𝑌𝑚𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 (
𝑇𝑋
𝑌
) ∆𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 − 𝜀𝑇𝑋,𝑌𝑚𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉 (
𝑇𝑋
𝑌
) ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉
− 𝜀𝑇𝑋,𝑌𝑚𝑇𝑅 (
𝑇𝑋
𝑌
) 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒]
1
1 − 𝜀𝑇𝑋,𝑌𝑚𝑇𝑋 (
𝑇𝑋
𝑌 )
 
                                                 
2
 The government consumption multipliers by Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) and those by Gechert and 
Rannenberg (2014) do not have the same interpretation. Qazizada and Stockhammer use government 
consumption as summary variable for all government expenditures. It should thus pick up other components of 
government expenditures and tax as far as they are correlated. In Gechert and Rannenberg, the government 
consumption multipliers are conditional on the other fiscal components and thus only measure partial effects. 
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∆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒 = [∆𝑇𝑅 − 𝜀𝑇𝑅,𝑌𝑚𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 (
𝑇𝑅
𝑌
) ∆𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 − 𝜀𝑇𝑅,𝑌𝑚𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉 (
𝑇𝑅
𝑌
) ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉
− 𝜀𝑇𝑅,𝑌𝑚𝑇𝑋 (
𝑇𝑅
𝑌
) 𝑇𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒]
1
1 − 𝜀𝑇𝑅,𝑌𝑚𝑇𝑅 (
𝑇𝑅
𝑌 )
 
These equations essentially state that the tax impulse, 𝑇𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒, is the observed tax, 
TX, income minus the tax income induced by government expenditures times, e.g. GCON, the 
respective multiplier, 𝑚𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 , and the income elasticity of taxes, 𝜀𝑇𝑋,𝑌 . We assume, for 
simplicity, that those elasticities are equal to unity, which is a crude but plausible 
approximation (Price et al. 2014). While the transformations may look substantial, it turns out 
that their effect on the results is rather small. 
The total fiscal impact, or growth contribution of fiscal policy is then defined as: 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁∆𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁 + 𝑚𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝑚𝑇𝑋∆𝑇𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒 + 𝑚𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒  
We have experimented with several ways of measuring downswings and we use an 
unemployment-based measure as our preferred method. We use quarterly unemployment rate 
as a measure of the business cycle to discern the business cycle turning points. We define a 
downswing as three or more consecutive quarters of uni-directional change with a minimum 
cumulative change of one percentage point in unemployment.
3
 Otherwise quarters a classified 
as upswings.  
An alternative is the use of OECD Composite Leading Index (OECD CLI). That is a 
widely used measure to distinguish upswings and downsizing; however, in our sample, the 
indicator often is at odds with the GDP growth rate of respective countries. For instance, in 
2009, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had negative GDP growth rates, but according to OECD 
CLI, 2009 is defined a period of expansion for these countries. Likewise, Spain in 2012 and 
Greece in 2012 and 2013 had negative growth rates, but those periods are expansion 
                                                 
3
 This way of delineating business cycles builds on Ball (1994, 1999). 
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according to OECD CLI. Short, the OECD CLI gives counterintuitive results for our sample, 
thus, we prefer the simple change in unemployment measure to identify upswings and 
downswings. A second alternative measure is the output gap. This relies on an estimate of the 
NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. Importantly, the data are only 
available at an annual basis. Using the output gap measure does give qualitatively similar 
results to the ones reported below.   
We identify up and downswings with quarterly data, but our fiscal variables are 
annual data. We calculate annual multipliers as the average of the four quarterly regimes. For 
instance, if there are three quarters of the downswing and one quarter of upswing in one year, 
the annual weighted average multiplier based on Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) will be 
(3.07*0.75+1.01*0.25)=2.56 for instance. For comparison, we also present the contribution 
of fiscal policy under the assumption of non-regime multipliers, assuming that multipliers are 
linear across different regimes. 
The source of our data for unemployment is OECD. All our other data are obtained 
from the AMECO database. 
 
The growth contributions of fiscal policy since the crisis 
Figure 1 plots the overall impact of fiscal policy on GDP based on the QS and GR 
multipliers for Germany, the UK, the USA Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain,. We 
report both the impacts on GR regime-dependent multipliers and GR non-regime multipliers 
(GR-NR). For most countries except Ireland, the QS and GR-based fiscal impacts look rather 
similar and differ in a qualitatively similar vein from the regime-independent impacts.  
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
While Germany had positive growth contribution throughout the period (except for 
GR non-regime measures for 2014), fiscal impacts were larger in 2008 and 2009 than 
thereafter (Figure 1.1). The effects overall, however, are modest. At the peak, fiscal impacts 
were below 1.5% of GDP (both according to the GR and the QS measure) and consistently 
below .5% after 2009. For the UK, we find positive and substantial fiscal impacts until 2010 
with both the QS and GR measure (Figure 1.2). The GR fiscal impact is at 4.5% of GDP for 
2009 substantially larger than the QS measure (just below 2%), but otherwise they are rather 
similar. The UK had modest negative fiscal impacts 2010 and 2011 (of up to 1% of GDP) and 
a neutral stance thereafter. The US’s positive fiscal impacts in 2008 and 2009 are much 
higher for the GR measure (7% in 2009) than with the QS measure (1%, 2009) (Figure 1.3). 
After 2010, the QS method shows marginally negative fiscal impacts and GR shows modest 
negative impacts (around -1%). For all three countries the non-regime multipliers depict very 
small fiscal impacts, never exceed the -1% to +1% of GDP band. 
For Greece, the fiscal impact was sizable and expansionary in 2009, with 3% of GDP 
according to GR multipliers and 4% according to QS multipliers (Figure 1.4). From 2010 
fiscal impacts were negative and large: around -7% in 2010, which fell to -4% in 2013. Only 
in 2014 was there a neutral fiscal impact. QS and GR fiscal impacts are very similar. GR non-
regime fiscal impacts give similar time profile, but substantially lower impacts. 
For Ireland, the QS multipliers imply expansionary effects in 2008, that fall sharply 
thereafter. In 2010, the QS fiscal impact amounts to -4% of GDP (Figure 1.5). Thereafter 
values are below -2%, but remain negative until 2014. Ireland is the one country where the 
QS and GR multipliers differ substantially. GR multipliers for Ireland are negative, which is 
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because of Ireland’s high import shares. This either means that Ireland has consistently 
negative multipliers or that this result is an artefact of the estimation method.
4
  
For Italy GR and QS, fiscal impacts indicate small positive growth contributions until 
2010 and then sizable negative impacts (Figure 1.6). Only for 2009 does the GR fiscal 
impacts exceed 2% of GDP. For Portugal we find positive fiscal impacts with the GR 
measure until 2010 (Figure 1.7). According to the GR multipliers, there was already a small 
negative fiscal impact in 2010. Overall, the GR and QS measures do give a similar picture for 
Portugal, though values are somewhat higher with the QS measure. For Spain, we find 
positive fiscal impacts until 2010 with both measures and negative impacts thereafter (Figure 
1.8). GR impacts are larger than QS impacts, in particular for 2009, where GR indicate a 
fiscal impact of 7%, but QS only 3% (non-regime GR impacts are 0.5%). The time profile 
looks similar with all three measures.  
 Overall GR and QS fiscal impacts show a similar picture, with the exception of 
Ireland, were GR gives negatives multipliers due to Ireland high import shares. GR impacts 
are larger than QS in most countries, most notably for 2008 and 2009. The QS measure is 
typically between the regime-dependent GR and non-regime GR. Overall government 
consumption seems to be a reasonably good proxy for overall fiscal policy. 
In all countries, we observe a policy change between 2008-09 and 2010-14 (see Table 
2). While the policy was clearly expansionary for all countries in the first phase, it shifted to 
restrictive or neutral in the second period. The extent to which this has happened differs 
substantially between the GIIPS and Germany, UK and USA. While policy shifted from 
                                                 
4
 While Ireland is often cited as case for EFC, recent studies report substantial positive multipliers for the 
Irish economy (Barrell et al 2013, Bergin et al 2013). Kinsella (2014) argues that its high degree of openness 
and positive trade shocks explain the Irish economic performance since 2010. 
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expansionary to neutral, i.e. withdrawing the stimulus in Germany, UK and USA, policy in 
the GIIPS took a much more contractionary turn. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
With the exception of Ireland, which gives somewhat mixed and inconclusive results, 
the general pattern arises that those countries that turned to a restrictive fiscal stance after 
2010 faced a double-dip recession. Those countries that embarked on a neutral or slightly 
expansionary fiscal stance experienced a recovery. Both patterns very much support a 
Keynesian story of a significant positive impact of fiscal policy on growth. One might argue 
that the crisis countries simply did not have the fiscal leeway for a neutral fiscal stance and 
had to embark on austerity without any realistic alternative, thus claiming a reverse-causality 
narrative from low growth to fiscal tightening. However, the bad growth performance in 
those countries is still at odds with the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis that 
forecasted a strong recovery for austere countries.    
To assess the size of the fiscal impact relative to a country’s actual GDP decline, we 
need to know its deviation from tend output. We calculate the pre-crisis trend growth for the 
1998-2008 period (see Table 2) and calculate potential GDP after 2008 based this trend 
growth. We regard this as a reasonable proxy for trend growth because none of the countries 
experienced strong inflationary pressure in that period. We then calculate the gap between 
actual GDP and potential GDP if growth had continued at pre-crisis trends. For 2001-14 we 
see a large gap for GIIPS countries and a modest one for UK and USA. Only for Germany 
did growth exceed pre-crisis trends. How much of this gap is explained by fiscal impacts? For 
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the Greece between half (according to the GR multipliers) and one third of the deviation for 
pre-crisis trend growth in the 2010-14 period is explained by fiscal contraction. For Portugal 
about half of the gap is due to fiscal policy; for Italy between on firth (with GR multipliers) 
and one third (with QS multipliers) and for Spain between one eighth (according to QS 
multipliers) and one third (with GR multipliers). Overall this suggests that the poor economic 
growth performance in the GIIPS countries since 2010 has to a significant extent be caused 
by contractionary fiscal policy. 
 
Conclusions 
The paper has calculated the effect of fiscal policy in eight OECD economics since 2008, 
based on the regime-dependent multipliers reported by Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) 
and Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) for the GIIPS countries, Germany, the USA and the UK. 
For most countries QS and GR fiscal impacts are similar, with GR impact typically showing 
larger effects. All countries pursued expansionary fiscal policy during the 2008/09 recession 
and all of them switched to austerity from 2010. However, the extent of fiscal tightening has 
differed substantially across countries. While austerity meant essentially a shift from 
expansionary to neutral for Germany, the USA and the UK, the fiscal contraction was much 
stronger in the GIIPS countries. As compared to the former group, the GIPS countries (with 
the exception of Ireland) experienced a substantial decline in output 2010-14 and fiscal policy 
explains, at least, half of this decline for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. We thus conclude 
that fiscal policy played a major role in the depression that southern European countries are 
experiencing. 
 
19 
 
References 
Afonso, A. (2006), ‘Expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe: new evidence’, ECB Working 
Paper No. 675  
Afonso, A., Gruner, H. and Kolerus, C. (2010), 'Fiscal policy and growth: do financial crises make a 
difference?', ECB Working Paper No. 1217 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995) ‘Fiscal expansions and fiscal adjustments in OECD countries’, 
Economic Policy, 10 (21), pp.205-248 
Arestis, P. (1992), The Post-Keynesian Approach to Economics: An Alternative Analysis of Economic 
Theory and Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Arestis, P, 2009. New Consensus Macroeconomics: A critical appraisal. Levy Institute Working Papers 
564 
Arestis, P. and Sawyer, M. (1998), 'Keynesian economic policies for the new millenium' Economic 
Journal, 108, 181-95 
Auerbach, A. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012a), Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2). S. 1–27.  
Auerbach, A, and Gorodnichenko, Y., (2012b) ‘Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion’, in 
Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, edited by Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Bachmann, R. and Sims, E. (2012) ‘Confidence and the transmission of government spending 
shocks’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 59, pp.235–249 
Ball, Laurence, 1994. Disinflation and the NAIRU. In: C. Romer and D. Romer (eds.): Reducing 
Inflation. Motivation and Strategy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Ball, Laurence, 1999. Aggregate demand and long-run unemployment. Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity 2, 1999: 189-236 
Barrell, R, Holland, D, Hurst, I, 2013. Fiscal multipliers and prospects for consolidation. OECD 
Journal: Economic Studies 3, 1: 71-102 
Barro, R (1989) ‘The Ricardian approach to budget deficit’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 
(2), pp. 37-54 
Bergin, A, Conefrey, T, FitzGerald, J, Kearney, I, Žnuderl, N, 2013. The HERMES-13 macroeconomic 
model of the Irish economy. ESRI Working Paper 460 
Blanchard, O. and Leigh, D. (2013), ‘Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers’, International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP13/1 
Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (2002) 'An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of changes 
in government spending and taxes on output', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4), 
pp. 1329-1368. 
Blanchard, O., Dell’Ariccia, G., Mauro, P., 2010. Rethinking macroeconomic policy. IMF Staff Position 
Note 10/03 
Burriel, P., de Castro, F., Garrote, D., Gordo, E., Paredes, J. and Perez, J. J. (2010) 'Fiscal policy 
shocks in the euro area and the US: an empirical assessment', Fiscal Studies, 31 (2), pp. 251-
285. 
Christiano, L, Eichenbaum, M, & Rebelo, S (2011), 'When Is the Government Spending Multiplier 
Large?', Journal Of Political Economy, 119 (1), pp. 78-121  
Coy, Peter (2010) Keynes vs. Alesina. Alesina Who? http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2010-06-
29/keynes-vs-dot-alesina-dot-alesina-who [accessed 5/1/2014] 
De Cos, P. and Moral-Benito, E. (2013), ‘Fiscal Multipliers in Turbulent Times: The Case of Spain’, 
Banco de Espana Working Paper No. 1309.  
Dullien, S. (2012), ‘Is new always better than old? On the treatment of fiscal policy in Keynesian 
models’, Review of Keynesian Economics, Inaugural Issue, pp. 5–23 
Eggertsson, G. and Krugman, P. (2012), ‘Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: a Fisher-Minsky-
Koo approach’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (3), pp.1469-1513 
Eggertsson, G. B. (2009) ‘What fiscal policy is effective at zero interest rate?, FRB of New York Staff 
Report No. 402. 
20 
 
Fatas, A. and Mihov, I. (2001), ‘The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: theory 
and evidence’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2760 London: Center for Economic Policy 
Research. 
Fernández-Villaverde, J. (2010) ‘Fiscal policy in a model with financial frictions’, American 
Economic Review, 100 (2), pp.35-40. 
Forni, L., Monteforte, L. and Sessa, L. (2009) 'The general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy: 
estimates for the Euro Area', Journal of Public Economics, 93, pp. 559-585 
Friedman, M. (1957), A theory of the consumption function. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Friedman, M. (1968), 'The role of monetary policy', The American Economic Review, 58 (1), pp. 1-17  
Gali, J., Lopez-Salido, J. D. and Valles, J. (2007), 'Understanding the effects of government spending 
on consumption', Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (1), pp. 227-270. 
Gechert, S, Hallett, Rannenberg, A, (2015), ‘Fiscal multipliers in downturns and the effects of 
Eurozone consolidation’, Vox.eu http://www.voxeu.org/article/fiscal-multipliers-and-
eurozone-consolidation (accessed 10/12/2015) 
Gechert, S. (2015), ‘What fiscal policy is most effective? A meta-regression analysis’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 67 (3), pp.553-580 
Gechert, S. and Mentges, R. (2013), ‘What Drives Fiscal Multipliers? The Role of Private Wealth and 
Debt’, IMK Working Paper 124-2013,  
Gechert, S. and Rannenberg, A. (2014) ‘Are fiscal multipliers regime-dependent? A meta regression 
analysis’, IMK Working Paper 139-2014  
Gechert, S. and Will, H. (2012) ’Fiscal Multipliers: A Meta Regression Analysis’, IMK Working 
Paper 97-2012, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute. 
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M. (1990), ‘Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two 
Small European Countries’,  NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5: 75–111 
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M. (1997), ‘Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy Changes: International 
Evidence and the Swedish Experience’, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 3 (1), pp. 67-103 
Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J. (1987) ‘New Keynesian and new classical economics’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 39 (1), pp. 119-133 
Hall, P, 1989. The political power of economic ideas. Keynesianism across nations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Hebous, S. (2011), ‘The Effects of Discretionary Fiscal Policy on Macroeconomic Aggregates: A 
Reappraisal’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 25 (4), pp.674–707 
Ilzetzki, E., Mendoza, E. G. and Vegh, C. A. (2013) 'How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?', Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 60 (2), pp. 239-254. 
Kinsella, S, (2014) Post-bailout Ireland as the poster child for austerity. CESifo Forum 2/2014, 20-25 
Krugman, P. (2010), Myths of austerity. New York Times, 2 July 2010 
Laidler, D. (1986) ‘The new-classical contribution to macroeconomics’, Banca Nazionale Del 
Lavaoro Quarterly Review, (1986), 39 (156) pp.27-55 
Lavoie, M, 2014. Post Keynesian economics.  New Foundations. Aldershot: Edward Elgar  
Mankiw, G. (2000) ‘The savers-spenders theory of fiscal policy’, NBER Working Paper No. 7571 
Michaillat, P. (2012) 'Fiscal multipliers over the business cycle', Centre for Economic Performance, 
LSE, CEP Discussion Papers No. 8610 
Palley, T. (1996), Post Keynesian Economics: Debt, Distribution and the Macro Economy, London: 
Macmillan 
Price, R. / Dang, T.-T. / Guillemette, Y. (2014), New Tax and Expenditure Elasticity Estimates for 
EU Budget Surveillance. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, Nr. 1174. 
Qazizada, W. and Stockhammer, E. (2015), Government spending multipliers in contraction and 
expansion, International Review of Applied Economics, 29 (2), pp.238-258 
Ramey, V. A. and Zubairy, S. (2013) ‘Government spending multipliers in good times and in bad: 
evidence from US historical data’, mimeo 
Ratto, M., Roeger, W. and Veld, J. (2009) 'QUEST III: An estimated open-economy DSGE model of 
the euro area with fiscal and monetary policy', Economic Modelling, 26 (1), pp. 222-233. 
21 
 
Setterfield, M. (1993), ‘Towards a Long-Run Theory of Effective Demand: Modeling 
Macroeconomic Systems with Hysteresis’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 15(3), 
pages 347-364,  
Spilimbergo, A. Symansky S. and Schindler M. (2009), Fiscal Multipliers. IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/09/11. 
Summers, L. (2014), ‘U.S. economic prospects: secular stagnation, hysteresis and the Zero Lower 
Bound’, Business Economics, 49(2), pp. 65-73 
Thomakos, D. (2012) ‘Fiscal multipliers in deep economic recessions and the case for a 2-year 
extension in Greece’s austerity programme’, Eurobank EFG Economic Research, 8 (4), pp. 1-
44 
Woodford, M. (2011), ‘Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier’, American 
Economic Journal Macroeconomics, 3(1), pp.1—35. 
  
22 
 
Table 1: Multipliers for Different Types of Government Spending from Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) and Qazizada and Stockhammer 
(2015) 
Regime-dependent Multipliers: Downswing Regime-dependent Multipliers: Upswing Regime-independent Multipliers  
Country GCON GINV GTAX GTRAN 
QS 
Multiplier 
GCON GINV GTAX GTRAN 
QS 
Multiplier 
GCON GINV GTAX GTRAN 
QS 
Multiplier 
Germany 1.48 1.58 0.09 2.25 3.07 0.19 -0.04 0.04 0.05 1.01 0.23 1.18 0.06 0.1 1.7 
UK 1.59 1.69 0.19 2.36 3.07 0.29 0.07 0.14 0.16 1.01 0.34 1.28 0.17 0.21 1.7 
USA 2.01 2.11 0.61 2.78 3.07 0.71 0.49 0.56 0.58 1.01 0.76 1.71 0.59 0.63 1.7 
Greece 0.23 0.33 -1.16 1 3.07 0.25 0.03 0.1 0.12 1.01 0.3 1.24 0.13 0.17 1.7 
Ireland 1.55 1.65 0.15 2.32 3.07 -1.06 -1.29 -1.21 -1.2 1.01 -1.02 -0.07 -1.19 -1.15 1.7 
Italy 1.67 1.77 0.27 2.43 3.07 0.43 0.21 0.28 0.3 1.01 0.48 1.42 0.31 0.35 1.7 
Spain 1.44 1.54 0.05 2.21 3.07 0.37 0.15 0.22 0.24 1.01 0.41 1.36 0.25 0.29 1.7 
Portugal 1.73 1.83 0.33 2.5 3.07 0.15 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 1.01 0.19 1.14 0.02 0.06 1.7 
Note: GCON=Government consumption Spending, GINV= Government investment, GTAX=Taxes, and GTRAN=Government Transfers Spending. GCON, GINV, GTAX 
and GTRAN are from Gechert and Rannenberg (2014). QS Multipliers refer to multiplier estimates from Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015).  
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Figure 1: Annual Impact of Fiscal Policy on GDP Growth for 2007-2014 
Note: QS refers to calculations using Qazizada and Stockhammer (2015) multipliers, GR refers to 
calculations based on Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) multipliers, and GR-NR refers to calculations 
using GR’s non-regime dependent multipliers. 
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Table 2: Cumulative Impact of Fiscal Policy Using GR and QS Multipliers  
Impact of Fiscal Policy with GR Multipliers 
 
Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2008/09 1.60% 6.90% 12.40% 5.60% -3.30% 3.30% 6.20% 12.70% 
2010/14 0.40% -1.10% -3.30% -20.60% 5.70% -1.90% -6.00% -5.50% 
Impact of Fiscal Policy with QS Multipliers 
 
Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2008/09 1.10% 2.00% 2.10% 2.90% 2.80% 0.40% 1.90% 4.10% 
2010/14 0.80% -1.10% -0.20% -12.20% -3.00% -2.80% -6.30% -2.90% 
Actual GDP Growth 
 
Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2008/09 -2.40% -1.80% -1.00% -0.90% -1.60% -4.00% -0.50% 0.10% 
2010/14 9.80% 8.70% 11.10% -24.00% 7.10% -2.60% -4.70% -2.50% 
Average Annual GDP Growth 1998-2008 
 
Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
1998/2008 1.58% 2.68% 2.57% 3.51% 5.13% 1.23% 1.62% 3.57% 
Gap Between Actual and Potential GDP  
 
Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2008/09 5.56% 7.16% 6.14% 7.93% 11.86% 6.47% 3.73% 7.05% 
2010/14 -1.91% 4.70% 1.74% 41.57% 18.55% 8.77% 12.79% 20.37% 
 
 
25 
 
Appendix 
A 1: Annual Impact of Fiscal Policy Using GR Multipliers  
Year Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 -0.67% 0.13% 2.01% 6.72% 0.68% -0.26% 1.86% -0.31% 
2008 0.35% 2.38% 4.61% 2.95% 8.65% 0.94% 2.17% 6.60% 
2009 2.25% 5.75% 5.95% 4.27% 2.90% 2.60% 6.54% 7.64% 
2010 0.23% -0.66% 0.09% -8.34% -2.88% 0.16% 2.30% 0.37% 
2011 -0.50% -1.17% -0.70% -5.90% -2.59% -1.35% -5.49% -1.84% 
2012 -0.09% 0.31% -0.48% -4.09% -0.72% -1.44% -5.45% -3.99% 
2013 0.11% -0.32% -0.48% -4.88% -0.51% -0.02% -0.72% -0.75% 
2014 0.10% 0.02% -0.64% 0.12% -0.50% 0.23% -0.42% -0.20% 
 
A 2: Cumulative Impact of Fiscal Policy Using GR Multipliers 
Year Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 -0.67% 0.13% 2.01% 6.72% 0.68% -0.26% 1.86% -0.31% 
2008 -0.32% 2.51% 6.62% 3.63% 15.37% 0.64% 1.90% 8.46% 
2009 1.93% 8.26% 12.57% 7.90% 18.27% 3.24% 8.44% 16.10% 
2010 2.16% 7.60% 12.66% -0.44% 15.39% 3.39% 10.74% 16.47% 
2011 1.66% 6.42% 11.97% -6.34% 12.79% 2.04% 5.25% 14.63% 
2012 1.57% 6.73% 11.49% -10.43% 12.08% 0.61% -0.20% 10.65% 
2013 1.69% 6.41% 11.00% -15.31% 11.56% 0.58% -0.91% 9.90% 
2014 1.78% 6.43% 10.36% -15.19% 11.07% 0.81% -1.33% 9.70% 
Year Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007/09 1.90% 8.30% 12.60% 7.90% 18.30% 3.20% 8.40% 16.10% 
2010/14 -0.10% -1.80% -2.20% -23.10% -7.20% -2.40% -9.80% -6.40% 
 
A 3: Annual Impact of Fiscal Policy Using QS Multiplier 
Year Germany UK US Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 0.05% 0.10% 0.80% 0.57% 2.37% -0.11% -0.16% 1.09% 
2008 0.50% 1.10% 1.40% 0.20% 2.50% 0.20% 0.30% 2.30% 
2009 0.70% 0.90% 0.70% 2.70% 0.30% 0.10% 1.60% 1.80% 
2010 0.20% -0.40% 0.20% -3.90% -2.30% 0.20% -0.60% 0.10% 
2011 0.10% -0.70% -0.10% -3.80% -0.60% -1.20% -2.20% -0.40% 
2012 0.10% 0.00% -0.10% -2.30% -0.20% -1.00% -3.70% -2.10% 
2013 0.20% -0.10% -0.10% -2.10% -0.10% -0.50% 0.20% -0.40% 
2014 0.20% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% -0.40% -0.10% 0.00% 
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A 4: Cumulative Impact of Fiscal Policy Using QS Multiplier 
Year Germany UK US Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 0.05% 0.10% 0.80% 0.57% 2.37% -0.11% -0.16% 1.09% 
2008 0.50% 1.17% 2.21% 0.81% 4.91% 0.13% 0.10% 3.44% 
2009 1.19% 2.11% 2.88% 3.48% 5.19% 0.25% 1.70% 5.23% 
2010 1.36% 1.71% 3.05% -0.42% 2.87% 0.48% 1.13% 5.28% 
2011 1.48% 0.98% 2.91% -4.24% 2.26% -0.73% -1.04% 4.92% 
2012 1.62% 1.01% 2.82% -6.53% 2.10% -1.71% -4.69% 2.77% 
2013 1.79% 0.89% 2.70% -8.65% 2.01% -2.17% -4.50% 2.35% 
2014 1.99% 0.97% 2.70% -8.69% 2.19% -2.56% -4.62% 2.33% 
Year Germany UK US Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007/09 1.19% 2.11% 2.88% 3.48% 5.19% 0.25% 1.70% 5.23% 
2010/14 0.80% -1.14% -0.18% -12.10% -2.99% -2.81% -6.32% -2.90% 
 
A 5: Actual GDP Growth  
Year Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 3.20% 2.50% 1.80% 3.50% 4.80% 1.50% 2.50% 3.70% 
2008 1.10% -0.30% -0.30% -0.40% -2.60% -1.00% 0.20% 1.10% 
2009 -5.60% -4.30% -2.80% -4.40% -6.40% -5.50% -3.00% -3.60% 
2010 4.10% 1.90% 2.50% -5.40% -0.30% 1.70% 1.90% 0.00% 
2011 3.60% 1.60% 1.60% -8.90% 2.80% 0.60% -1.80% -0.60% 
2012 0.40% 0.70% 2.30% -6.60% -0.30% -2.80% -4.00% -2.10% 
2013 0.10% 1.70% 2.20% -3.90% 0.20% -1.70% -1.60% -1.20% 
2014 1.60% 2.80% 2.40% 0.80% 4.80% -0.40% 0.90% 1.40% 
  Germany UK USA Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007/09 -1.40% -2.10% -1.30% -1.40% -4.20% -5.10% -0.30% 1.20% 
2010/14 9.80% 8.70% 11.10% -24.00% 7.10% -2.60% -4.70% -2.50% 
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A 6: Annual Impact of Fiscal Policy Using QS Multipliers with Output Gap-based Definition 
of Recession 
Year Germany UK US Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 0.10% 0.20% 0.44% 1.14% 1.33% -0.21% -0.20% 0.95% 
2008 0.55% 0.73% 0.78% 0.20% 1.42% 0.29% 0.18% 1.30% 
2009 1.82% 1.60% 1.15% 1.49% 0.48% 0.20% 2.74% 3.05% 
2010 1.05% -0.68% 1.03% -2.17% -3.99% 0.40% -0.97% 0.09% 
2011 0.24% -1.25% -0.87% -6.51% -1.04% -2.07% -3.71% -0.62% 
2012 0.92% 0.19% -0.52% -3.91% -0.62% -1.66% -6.24% -3.66% 
2013 1.04% -0.76% -0.78% -4.41% -0.52% -0.78% 0.72% -1.12% 
2014 1.21% 0.51% 0.02% -0.24% 1.15% -0.67% -0.74% -0.14% 
 
 
A 7: Annual Impact of Fiscal Policy Using GR Multipliers with Output Gap-based Definition 
of Recession 
Country Germany UK US Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
2007 0.02% 0.06% 0.36% 0.15% -3.62% -0.20% 0.04% 0.18% 
2008 0.07% 0.16% 1.99% -0.09% -7.58% 0.44% -0.13% 1.19% 
2009 2.44% 4.70% 7.06% 0.67% -1.96% 2.48% 4.70% 7.26% 
2010 0.60% -0.34% 2.01% -0.69% -0.49% 0.20% 2.12% 0.51% 
2011 0.17% -0.84% -2.01% -5.22% -0.12% -1.23% -3.99% -1.75% 
2012 0.29% 1.00% -1.14% -3.74% 0.98% -1.31% -4.75% -3.76% 
2013 0.54% -0.58% -1.02% -5.61% 0.32% -0.05% 0.85% -1.05% 
2014 0.86% 0.79% -0.13% 1.96% 2.30% 0.23% -1.34% -0.11% 
 
 
 
